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OPTIMAL COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT IN GENERIC ADVERTISING, EXPORT  
MARKET PROMOTION AND COST-OF-PRODUCTION REDUCING RESEARCH 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Optimal investment rules are developed for a producer agency investing in domestic 
market generic advertising, export market promotion, and cost of production reducing 
research.  Analytical results show fundamental difference in optimal investment rules 
when the producer group is assumed to maximise either producers' surplus or social 
surplus.  Incorporating a constraint limiting total expenditure on the three activities 
substantially alters the structure of the optimal investment rules.  Results highlight the 
importance of accounting for the financing mechanism when modelling optimal producer 
investment. Simulation of the optimal intensities suggests the proposed budget of the 
Canadian Beef Cattle Research Market Development and Promotion Agency under-
estimates the optimal level of investment.  
JEL Classification code(s): Q1, M3 
Keywords: Advertising, export promotion, research, optimal investment 
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INTRODUCTION 
Agricultural producer organisations have a strong history of investing in activities 
designed to either increase the size of the domestic market, the size of the export market, 
or to help producers achieve cost savings through production research. Historic examples 
of agencies engaging in such activities include the National Cattlemen's Beef Association 
and National Pork Producer's Council in the U.S., the Beef Information Centre in Canada, 
the Canadian Beef Export Federation, Canada Pork International, and the U.S. Beef 
Export Federation, among others.  Given that agricultural producers typically contribute 
to such activities through check-offs, many have asked whether such investment has paid 
for itself (e.g., Cranfield and Goddard; Piggott et al.; Ward and Lambert).  The general 
conclusion is that net returns are positive and large.
1  However, much of the progress in 
this area considers investment in a single activity, a closed economy, or both.  Although, 
Alston et al. (1994, 1995) and Kinnucan consider advertising a traded good in both large 
and small country scenarios, Ding and Kinnucan considered optimal investment in 
domestic and export market promotion, while Sellen and Goddard, and Chyc and 
Goddard, considered optimal investment in domestic advertising and production research.  
The mode by which investment funds are generated has also received attention, typically 
with the question  "what lump sum investment is optimal?" or "what is the optimal per 
unit check-off?" (e.g., Alston et al., 1994; Kinnucan and Myrland).   
These studies notwithstanding, recognise that the manner by which multiple 
activities are financed has a bearing on the optimal investment policy.  If investment in 
generic advertising, export promotion and production research is financed via a 
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centralised check-off, then investment in each alternative will compete for a share of total 
available funds.  In such instances, one would expect the investment in a specific option 
to be commensurate with the impact that alternative has on producer benefits, but relative 
to the impact of other alternatives.  In contrast, if each investment option is financed in 
isolation of the other alternatives, one would not expect to see a direct relationship 
between investment alternatives.  
The objective of this paper is to develop optimal investment rules when a 
producer agency invests in domestic market generic advertising, export market 
promotion, and cost-of-production reducing research.  Specific consideration is given to a 
country holding an export position, with two distinct financing scenarios.  In the first 
scenario, total investment across the three activities is not constrained a priori; that is, 
optimal investment in each activity dictates the optimal lump sum check-off needed to 
finance that activity.  In the second scenario, a producer agency is assumed to have a 
fixed amount of money to optimally allocate across the three investment activities.  The 
distinction lies in the structure of the optimisation problem.  The first case is an 
unconstrained problem, while the second scenario is a maximisation problem subject to 
an expenditure constraint where financing is centralised.  To add further richness, the 
objective function being maximised is varied.  Consideration is first given to optimal 
producer investment by maximising producers' surplus.  As some producer groups have 
been given a legislative mandate to use check-off levies, and given that consumers may 
bear a burden of any check-off, it is equally important to consider optimal investment 
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from a social perspective.  In this regard, optimal investment rules are derived when the 
objective is to maximise social surplus.   
The underlying economic framework is presented next.  Optimal investment rules 
for generic advertising, export promotion and research are then derived with and without 
an expenditure constraint.  In the former case, the optimal rules are examined for 
sensitivity to changes in advertising, export promotion and research elasticities.  
Numerical analysis is then conducted to provide estimates of optimal investment 
strategies for the Canadian beef industry. Finally, the paper is summarised and policy 
implications drawn. 
ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK 
The market environment is assumed to be static, certain, and competitive, where the law 
of one price holds, trade occurs without barriers (i.e., no transport or marketing costs, no 
trade barriers) and the exporter is assumed to be large enough to affect the market-
clearing price. Furthermore, a single market level is assumed.
2  Figure 1 shows a 
graphical representation of the framework.  The left-hand side of the diagram represents 
the domestic market, while the right hand side represents the export market.  Domestic 
demand is represented by   where P is price, A is advertising,  ( A P D , ) 0 < ∂ ∂ P D  and 
0 > ∂ ∂ A D , while domestic supply is represented by  ( ) R P S , , where R is cost-of-
production reducing research,  0 > ∂ ∂  and  P S 0 > ∂ ∂ R S .  An export position is assumed, 
so the exporter's excess supply curve is the difference in domestic supply and demand, 
and denoted by ES.  Demand for the country's exports is represented by the export 
function T , where M is export market promotion,  ( M P, ) 0 < ∂ ∂ P T  and  0 > ∂ ∂ M T .  
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The equilibrium price, denoted by 
* P , occurs where export demand equals excess supply.  
Markets clear with Q  units exported and domestic demand and supply equalling Q  







( A P ′ , ( R′ ,
  Assuming simultaneous increases in advertising, research and export promotion, 
the equilibrium price and quantities will change.  Suppose domestic demand shifts to 
, domestic supply to  ) ) D P S , and export demand to  ( ) M P T ′ , .  As drawn, these 
changes raise the equilibrium price to 
* * P , equilibrium trade to Q , domestic demand to 
 and domestic supply to Q .  Given these parallel shifts the increase in advertising, 







3,4  Recognise, 
however, that the direction and magnitude of the change in producers' surplus will differ 
according to the size of shifts.  This then raises the question of what level of investment 
in advertising, export promotion and research would maximise producers' surplus. 
As such, one would like to have analytical formulae relating optimal investment 
in generic advertising, export promotion and production research to measurable data and 
elasticities.  To derive such formulae it is assumed that domestic producers collectively 
engage in research, advertising and export promotion to maximise producers' surplus.  
Furthermore, investment decisions are implemented through a producer agency where a 
manager (or group of managers) within the agency acts on behalf of producers in 
choosing optimal investment levels.  However, some governments have passed 
legislation enabling the creation of agencies that undertake generic advertising, export 
promotion and research activities for a group of producers.  Given the legislative mandate 
  5 
underlying formation of such agencies, consideration ought to be given to the socially 
optimal level of investment.  In this case, the objective is to maximise social surplus 
defined as domestic consumers' and producers' surplus.  
A factor that cannot be overlooked is that producer agency budgets are often fixed 
a priori.  In such instances investment alternatives must compete for a share of a fixed 
amount of money.  Consequently, optimal investment is limited by an expenditure 
constraint that says investment in A, M and R must add-up to a fixed, known level, F.  
The manager(s) within the agency is then faced with a constrained optimisation problem 
that will affect the investment level in each activity compared to a situation without an 
expenditure constraint. 
Since a multitude of optimisation problems come about from the described 
options, it is convenient to write the optimisation as: 
() ( )
() () ( ) ( M R A F M R A
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where δ  and δ  are binary indicator parameters to be defined latter, 











1 ( ) A D ,
1 τ
−  is the inverse demand 
function,   represents producers' surplus, where  ( R S , ) Q PQS C − ( ) R QS, C  is the aggregate 
variable cost function, Ω shows the burden of the check-off borne by producers, and λ 
is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the expenditure constraint. The use of indicator 
parameters allows one to express a number of different optimisations problems with one 
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formulation.  For example, including consumers' surplus in the producer group's 
optimisation means   (otherwise  1 = δC 0 = δC ), if expenditure is constrained a priori, then 
 (otherwise δ ).  1 = δPEC 0
( δ
= PEC
− Ω + 1
() C δ
1 = δC
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The term   merits explanation.  It reflects the fact that if the 
objective is to maximise producers' surplus (i.e., 
) C C δ
0 = δC ), then the optimisation problem 
takes account of the producers' portion of the tax-burden arising from any check-off.  In 
this case, δ  reduces to  C Ω + − 1 Ω.  If, however, a social surplus perspective is taken, 
so  , then the optimisation problem takes account of the total (i.e., producers' and 
consumers' burden) portion of the tax-burden arising from any check-off, and 
 reduces to a value of 1.  () C δ −
In deriving the first order conditions it is important to recognise that equilibrium 
quantities vary with A, R, and M.  As such, the upper limit of integration in the producer 
group's optimisation varies with the investment level. Given this, the first order 
conditions can be written as: 
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Assuming research lowers the variable cost of production, the partial of C  with 
respect to research is negative.  To make the analysis transparent, this sign condition has 




PEC δ  
different goals can be achieved. In what follows, the case of unconstrained expenditure 
( ) is first explored, followed by constrained expenditure ( 0 = δPEC 1 = δPEC ). 
OPTIMAL UNCONSTRAINED INVESTMENT  
When expenditure on generic advertising, export promotion and production research is 
unconstrained, equation (4) falls out of the first order conditions, as does the Lagrange 
multiplier.  Assuming a parallel shift in domestic demand, the integrand in (1) is 
independent of quantity and equal to  A P ∂ ∂ .  After cancelling terms related to  A P ∂ ∂  in 
(1) and turning the relevant derivatives into elasticities, the first order conditions can be 
solved to arrive at formulae defining the optimal investment intensity for each activity: 
() () C C
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where  i γ  is the ratio of optimal investment in the ith activity to producers' market 
revenue and is referred to as the investment intensity,  { } M R A Z i , , = ∈ ,   is the 
elasticity of price with respect to the ith activity, 
i π
( ) 0 > = D T Q Q k , ξ  is the elasticity of 
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variable production costs with respect to research, and   is the ratio of variable 
production cost to producers' market revenue (i.e., 
s
( ) S PQ C ). 
0 ≠ γ R
i π
  Notice that if  , then  0 = πi 0 = γ = γ M A  but  .  This means that if the 
exporting country is characterised as small and open, advertising and export promotion 
activities should not be used, as investment in these activities will not change price.  This 
reflects earlier work by Alston et al. (1994) and Kinnucan.  However, investment in 
research, which shifts the cost function, and therefore the domestic supply curve, should 
be undertaken.  To see this, set  0 = π
)
R in (3'), so the optimal research intensity becomes 
.  Since  ( ( 1 δ − Ω + δ ξ = γ C R s )
1 −
C ξ  is assumed to be positive so too is  R γ .  Thus, even 
when the market is small and open, the producer group should invest in production 
research that shifts the domestic supply function out provided  0 > ξ .   
To operationalise (1'), (2') and (3'), values for  , ξ ,   and  s Ω are needed.  The 
value for ξ  can be determined empirically,  is datum, while  s Ω can be derived from the 
structure of the market model.  Values for  i π  are derived using an equilibrium 
displacement model based on a market model represented with the following equations: 
() () A M R A P D QD , , , =   (5)
() () R M R A P S QS , , , =   (6)
() () M M R A P T QT , , , =   (7)
D S T Q Q Q − ≡ .  (8)
  9 
Equation (5) is the domestic demand function, (6) is the supply function, (7) is an export 
demand function
5, while (8) provides a market closure rule.  That equilibrium price and 
quantities are functions of A, M and R has been explicitly included. 
  Taking the logarithmic partial derivative of equations (5) through (8) with respect 
to advertising results in the following system of equations: 













































































































where η  and β  are the price and advertising elasticities of demand, 
respectively, ε  is the supply elasticity and 
( 0 > ) ) ( 0 >
) ( 0 > ( ) 0 > e  is the elasticity of demand for the 
country's exports.  After substituting (5'), (6') and (7') into (8') and manipulating, one can 
derive the following: 
ζ
β
= πA  
(9)
where  () ke k + η + ε + = ζ 1 , which is positive for normally considered values of the 
elasticities and corresponding trade-to-demand ratio.  A similar procedure can be 
performed for the export market promotion elasticity: 

















where ϕ  is the elasticity of export demand with respect to export market promotion 




  Substituting (9) into (1') and (10) into (2') gives optimal investment intensity rules 
for domestic generic advertising and export market promotion:  
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both of which are positive in normal cases (i.e., when elasticities have expected signs).  
For the optimal research intensity rule substitute (11) into (3'): 
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.   To understand the intuition underlying 
this last equation, note that all things being equal, an increase in research is assumed to 
lower the cost function,C .  However, equilibrium quantities are assumed to 
increase in R.  If the quantity increase is sufficiently large, the variable cost of production 
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at the new equilibrium quantity may actually rise in response to research. This leads to 
the result that the commodity agency should invest in cost-of-production reducing 
research when C() ( R Q C R Q S S ) ′ ′ > , , , where Q S S Q′ <  correspond to research levels 
, respectively.  This will be true when the cost reducing effect of research is large 
and the quantity increasing effect of research is small.  In this setting, a small elasticity of 
the quantity supplied with respect to research is actually preferred. 
R R ′ <
∞ = e
R
0 = δ γ C i ( ) 1 = δC i
() 1 = δ δ γ C A C A Ω
To re-iterate an earlier point, in a small open economy, which is the case when 
, the agency should not engage in domestic advertising, as shifts in the domestic 
demand curve have no effect on price, nor should the agency use export market 
promotion expenditure for the same reason. However, even in the case of a small open 
economy, the agency should engage in production related research. To see this last point, 
apply l'Hôpital's rule (with respect to e) to equation (14) and note that the limiting 
behaviour of γ  as export demand becomes perfectly elastic is  s ξ . 
  Equations (12), (13) and (14) show that optimal advertising, export market 
promotion and research intensities depend on price elasticities, the elasticity of quantity 
demanded (or supplied) with respect to the respective investment alternative,  ,  ,   
and the incidence parameter.  For comparison, the top half of Table 1 shows the optimal 
investment intensities when the producer group maximises producers' surplus and social 
surplus (denoted below as 
k ξ s
()  and γ  respectively).  It can be shown that 
() 0 γ > =  provided  1 < , but are equal when  1 = Ω . Thus, when producers 
bear a fraction of the check-off, the optimal advertising intensity falls when domestic 
consumer surplus is added to the optimisation problem.  When optimal export market 
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promotion intensities are compared, the following ranking results: 
() ( 1 0 = δ ) γ > = δ γ C M C M  provided  1 < Ω  and k .  Although trivial, if trade does not 
occur export market promotion investment will not occur.  Finally, to compare optimal 
production research intensities note that the denominator in 
0 >
( ) 0 = δ γ C R  is less than the 
denominator in  ( 1 = ) δ γ C R  provided  1 < Ω , but the numerator in  ( ) 0 = δ γ C R  is less than 
that in  () 1 = δ γ C R
() 0 = δ
 provided θ .  Consequently, there is an ambiguous ranking of  0 >
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OPTIMAL CONSTRAINED INVESTMENT 
When producer agency budgets are fixed, the producer group must decide on the optimal 
allocation of scarce funds across the three investment options.  Here, the aim is to 
maximise producers' surplus (or social surplus) through investment in generic 
advertising, research and export market promotion subject to an expenditure constraint.  
This means   in the first order conditions (1) to (4), which can now be written as: 
( () () 1
0
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As before, the integrand in (1'') is assumed to be independent of quantity.  However, the 
Lagrange multiplier can be eliminated.  To do so, elasticitisize (1'') to (4''), substitute in 
equations (9), (10) and (11) and manipulate to derive the following: 
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0 ˆ ˆ ˆ = γ − γ − γ − Γ M R A .  (18)
where  () S PQ F = Γ  and  i γ ˆ  represent the optimal investment intensity when the producer 
group faces an expenditure constraint.  Since (15) to (18) describe the first order 
conditions for a maximisation problem subject to an expenditure constraint, use the 
Hotelling-Wold identity to eliminate  ( ) λ + δ − Ω + δ C C 1  and arrive at the following: 
Γ Ξ β = γ
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As with the unconstrained case, the distinction between a small and large country 
affects the optimal investment intensity.  If the market is characterised as small, the 
producer agency should not invest in domestic market generic advertising and export 
market promotion, as shifts in domestic and export demand do not effect price.  However, 
the producer group should invest all of their funds in production research.  (As with the 
unconstrained case, apply l'Hopital's rule to equation (21) and note that  R γ ˆ  approaches 
 as export demand becomes perfectly elastic).  Even though production research does 
not affect the equilibrium price, the cost savings increases producers' surplus thereby 
providing an incentive to invest in production research.   
s ξ
The bottom half of Table 1 shows  i γ ˆ  when the producer group maximises 
domestic producers' surplus ( 0 = δC ) and social surplus ( 1 = δC ).   Contrary to the 
unconstrained case, it is not possible to unambiguously rank the optimal investment 
intensities when expenditure is constrained.
6  However, one can investigate how changes 
in advertising, research and export promotion elasticities affect the optimal constrained 
intensities by taking the partial derivative of  i γ ˆ
A
 with respect to the jth activity’s elasticity.  
These qualitative results are shown in Table 2. At first blush, it appears that when the 
objective is to maximise producers' surplus, γ ˆ  may increase or decrease in β, while  M γ ˆ  
and  R γ ˆ  unambiguously fall in β.  However, note that since Γ is fixed, the total effect of 
a change in β on   must be zero. Since  Γ 0 ˆ < β ∂ γ ∂ M ,  0 ˆ < β ∂ γ ∂ R and 
0 = ˆ ˆ β ∂ ˆ γ ∂ ∂ + β γ ∂ + β ∂ γ ∂ R A M ,  β ∂ γ ∂ A ˆ  must actually be positive.  By the same 
argument,  ϕ ∂ γ ∂  must also be positive.  These revised qualitative results are shown in  M ˆ
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bracketed terms in Table 2.  Note that identical qualitative results are derived when social 
surplus is considered. 
Note that regardless of whether domestic or social surplus is maximised, the price 
elasticities of demand and supply still play a role through the ζ  term appearing in the 
denominator of each optimal investment intensity equation.  In contrast, Ding and 
Kinnucan, who considered optimal promotion investment in domestic and export 
markets, derived optimal investment rules that were not directly dependent upon 
quantity-price elasticities of demand or supply.  Differences in this qualitative result stem 
from the inclusion of cost-of-production reducing research in this paper.   
AN APPLICATION TO THE CANADIAN BEEF INDUSTRY 
To cast the optimal investment intensity rules in better light, they are applied to the 
Canadian beef industry.  This industry offers an interesting application as they lobbied for 
and were granted permission to establish an umbrella organisation to co-ordinate 
producer investment in domestic and export market promotion and production research.   
Because the "Canadian Beef Cattle Research Market Development and Promotion 
Agency" (Agency) was established under the auspices of the Farm Products Agencies 
Act, the legislative powers of government were used in its formation.  To some, this 
would suggest that consideration be given to socially optimal investment when 
establishing investment strategies.  Furthermore, the application made by Canadian 
Cattleman's Association (the national body representing beef-cattle producers in Canada) 
to the National Farm Products Council (NFPC) indicated a benchmark level of funding to 
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be made available for distribution across advertising, promotion and research.  As such, 
consideration ought to also be given to the constrained optimal investment intensities. 
  Numerical simulation is conducted to show the range of values for  i γ  and  i γ ˆ  
based on "best-guess" estimates of elasticities for the Canadian beef cattle complex in a 
post-WTO environment.  (For convenience, the optimal advertising intensity will be 
reported as a percent.) Table 3 shows the assumed elasticity and data values used in 
calculating the optimal investment intensities and sources.  Goddard and Griffith reported 
own-price and advertising elasticities for beef in Canada equal to -0.23 and 0.004, 
respectively, which are used here.  Since reliable estimates of   are not available and 
Canada holds a net export position live cattle and beef,   assumes the value -5, which is 
thought to be reflective of the demand response for Canadian beef-cattle exports.  
Estimates of  , the elasticity of export demand with respect to export market promotion, 




ϕ is assumed to equal β. 
Cranfield and Goddard reported own-price supply elasticities for live-cattle in 
western Canada equal to 0.431.  This value is consistent with supply elasticities reported 
for the literature and is used here.  Widmer et al. estimated supply response elasticities 
for production research in the Canadian beef industry.  Short run elasticities range from 
0.01 to 0.04, with the long run elasticity reported at 0.36.  For this paper, a middle ground 
approach is taken, with   set equal to 0.1. Chan-Kang et al. estimated the elasticity of 
cost with respect to research for the Canadian food-manufacturing sector to equal 0.092.  
While this value is for food-processing, other references to the cost-research elasticity are 
not readily apparent in the literature.  As such, 
θ
ξ  is set equal to 0.092. 
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  The value for   is set at 0.31, which is the average value of   using 1995-1998 
data obtained from Agriculture Canada’s Livestock Market Review.  Variable costs' 
share of market revenue ( ) is pegged at 0.64, which is the 1995-1998 average value of 
the ratio of operating costs (net interest) to the value of farm product in the Ontario 
feedlot sector (OMAFRA).   Following Kinnucan, the tax-incidence parameter is 
calculated using:  
k k
s







where  () t p p − = ν , t is the per unit levy used to finance generic advertising activity and 
⋅  is the absolute value operator.  The per unit levy is set equal to equal $1 per head, 
stated in live-weight equivalent (a slaughter weight animal is assumed to be 1,200 
pounds, so the equivalent check-off is $1/1200 per pound).  Price is the average price 
(over 1995-1998) of slaughter-weight cattle as reported in Agriculture Canada's 
Livestock Market Review. 
  Lastly, to calculate the constrained optimal investment intensities, the ratio of the 
fixed amount of funds to market revenue needs to be determined.  In the CCA's 
submission to the NFPC, the budget for the proposed agency was estimated to be 
between $8 and $8.5 million.  Agriculture Canada’s Livestock Market Review places 
farm-level market revenue for fed cattle at about C$3.39 billion.  This suggests   be set 
at approximately 0.24 (percent of market revenue). 
Γ
  Table 4 shows the simulation results of the constrained and unconstrained 
investment strategies under the assumption of producers' surplus and social surplus 
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maximisation.  Regardless of whether the objective being maximised is producers' or 
social surplus, the expenditure constrained intensities are all less than the unconstrained 
intensities.  This suggests the budget proposed by the CCA under-estimates the optimal 
level of total investment.  When producers' surplus is maximised the sum of the 
unconstrained intensities is 0.71, which is about three times as large as  .  When social 
surplus is maximised, the sum of the unconstrained intensities is 0.49, which is about 
twice as big as  .  Table 4 also shows the proportion of the "total" intensity allocated to 
advertising, export market promotion and research.  When producers' surplus is 
maximised, the proportion of the total investment intensity allocated to the three 
alternatives is identical regardless of whether investment is constrained.  However, when 
social surplus is maximised, the imposition of the expenditure constraint changes the 
relative magnitude of the optimal allocation scheme. Research receives considerably 
more investment when expenditure is constrained, at the expense of both advertising and 
export market promotion. 
Γ
Γ
  One issue of concern is how changes in the various parameters of equations (12)-
(14) and (19)-(21) affect the optimal investment intensity in the various activities.  
Trivially, one can see that in the unconstrained case a given increase in the domestic 
advertising elasticity or export promotion elasticity will increase investment in those 
alternatives by amount equal to the given change.  For example, if β increased by 5%, 
then so too would the optimal investment intensity in domestic advertising.  Furthermore, 
the optimal investment intensity in the other activities would not change.  However, if the 
elasticity of cost with respect to research or supply with respect to research changes, then 
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the effect on the optimal research intensity will not be proportional.  To illustrate this last 
point Table 5 shows the optimal investment intensities when ξ  and θ increase and 
decrease by 5% as well as the percent difference between the base case investment 
intensities and the shocked intensities.  When ξ  (θ) is shocked, the optimal research 
intensities move in the same (opposite) direction as the change in ξ , as expected, but by 
a different magnitude than the respective change in either ξ  or θ.  This reflects the 
additive nature of the numerator in equation (14).   
k
A γ
  One further point to note regarding the unconstrained optimal investment 
intensities is the role of the trade-to-demand ratio,  .  Except for the optimal advertising 
intensity,   appears in the numerator and denominator of the optimal intensities for 
export promotion and research.  As such, changes in   will be expected to affect the 
optimal investment intensities in something other than a proportional relationship.  To 
illustrate, Table 5 shows that a 5% increase (decrease) in k  lowers (raises) 
k
k
A γ  by less 
than 5%, as expected given k  appears in the denominator of  .  The effect on export 
promotion depends on the nature of the optimisation problem one assumes.  A 5% 
increase in   increases optimal investment in export promotion by less than 5% when the 
producer agency is assumed to maximise producers' surplus.  When the producer agency 
is assumed to maximise social surplus 
k
M γ  actually increases (decreases) by more than 
5%.  Lastly, changes in k  have a dramatic effect on  R γ .  Specifically,  R γ  moves in the 
same direction as  , but by a magnitude of about 40-45%.  These results suggest that if 
Canadian beef exports grow relative to the domestic market, that less money ought to be 
k
  20 
invested in domestic advertising (relative to market revenue), and more in export market 
promotion and production research.  Furthermore, results underscore the importance of 
research and trade when assessing producers' optimal investment patterns through a 
commodity agency. 
  When the producer agency has a fixed amount of money to allocate across the 
three investment alternatives, a change in the elasticity for one of these activities will 
have an impact on investment for all activities.  This is evident by examining equations 
(19)-(21), which show that the denominator for all optimal investment intensities are a 
function of the elasticities for domestic advertising, export market promotion and 
research.  Hence an change in any one of these elasticities will have bearing on the 
optimal allocation of the fixed amount of money, F.  Table 6 shows the optimal 
investment intensities when the base values of ξ , θ and   increase and decrease by 5%.  
Given the structure of the expenditure constrained optimal investment intensity rules, the 
directional affects of the assumed shocks are expected.  The magnitude of these effects is 
an empirical issue that depends on the assumed elasticities and data values. 
k
  Of particular note, however, is that changes arising from shocks to  ,   and   
are of a far greater magnitude (in absolute value) when producers' surplus is maximised 
than when social surplus is maximised.  This arises because of differences in the term 
multiplied by   (which is   in the case of producers' surplus maximisation and 1  in 
the case if social surplus maximisation).  Furthermore, the optimal investment intensity 
equations differ according to the objective function being maximised.  Lastly, a change in 
the trade-to-demand ratio has a different effect on the optimal investment intensity for 
ξ θ k
θ k k +
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export market promotion depending on the objective function.  When producers' surplus 
is maximised,  M γ ˆ  falls when   increases, while  k M γ ˆ  increases in   when social surplus 
is maximised.  Again, this reflects differences in the nature of both the numerator and 
denominator of the respective optimality rules. 
k
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Optimal investment rules are developed for the case of a producer agency investing in 
generic advertising in the domestic market, export market promotion, and cost-of-
production reducing research.  These rules were developed assuming the objective is to 
maximise either producers' surplus or social surplus, with and without an expenditure 
constraint limiting the amount of money available for investment.   The primary 
implication of this work relates to the mechanism by which the producer group raises the 
funds needed to finance their investment activities.  If each activity's funds are raise 
independent of the other activities, then the optimal investment intensities derived 
without an expenditure constrained should be used to determine the optimal investment 
level.   When the available funds are fixed a priori, for example when a producer 
organisation has a budget laid out via a business plan subject to producer approval, the 
optimal investment intensity rules developed with the expenditure constraint should be 
used in determining the optimal allocation.  Note too that if, in the short run, the producer 
group uses a per unit check-off applied to the sale of the agricultural commodity to 
finance their activities, and if supply is fixed in the short run, then the available funds are 
also fixed and should be allocated using the expenditure constrained investment intensity 
rules.  Such is the case in the Canadian dairy sector where milk production is rationed via 
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production quota.  Finally, if financing is raised through a centralised check-off that is 
allocated across investment options, the optimal investment rules derived with the 
expenditure constraint should be used to calculating the optimal pattern of investment.  
Doing so allows the manager(s) within the producer agency to account for the role of 
competing investments when determining the optimal allocation across the three 
activities. 
  Simulation of the optimal intensities using "best-guess" estimates of the 
underlying elasticities and actual market data for the Canadian beef-cattle industry 
indicates the proposed budget for the recently established "Canadian Beef Cattle 
Research Market Development and Promotion Agency" under-estimates the optimal level 
of investment.  Regardless of whether producers' surplus or social surplus was being 
maximised, the sum of unconstrained investment intensities for advertising, export 
market promotion and cost-of-production reducing research was greater than the 
investment intensity implied by the proposed budget for the aforementioned agency.  
Sensitivity of the optimal investment intensities was also investigated.  Analysis suggests 
that the trade-to-demand ratio and cost-of-production related research elasticities are key 
factors in calculating optimal investment strategies for the Canadian beef-cattle industry. 
  The investment rules developed here are predicated on parallel shifts in the 
respective curves.  Clearly, this is a limiting assumption.  Without appeal to specific 
functional forms the analysis of pivotal changes is difficult.  Nevertheless, the role of a 
pivotal change is worthy of discussion, especially in the context of the producer group's 
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objective function.  For some pivotal changes, the welfare changes will differ in sign and 
order of magnitude compared to welfare changes arising from parallel shifts.  
Further work could focus on a number of areas.  First, a static model has been 
used to simplify the analysis.  Extending the current model to account for the dynamic 
nature of returns stemming not only from production research but also from advertising 
and export promotion would allow for the incorporation of a discount rate reflecting 
producers' time value of money.  Relaxing the certainty assumption would prove useful 
in developing a portfolio approach to allocating a fixed investment budget across 
activities with potentially uncertain returns.  In this sense, one could view the producer 
groups' optimisation problem to be one of maximising expected utility of wealth of a 
representative producer by constructing an optimal portfolio of advertising, export 
promotion, and research investments.  The dynamic and uncertain extensions of the 
model could also be cast in a real options framework where the managerial decision is to 
make irreversible investments in the three activities with an uncertain return.  Lastly, the 
analysis conducted here assumed an interior solution in the sense that the producer group 
invests in all three activities.  However, scope exists for the producer group to use a 
subset of the given activities.  Consequently, extending this framework to allow for 
corner solutions (even in the case of a large open economy) would prove useful in 
developing guidelines that assist producer groups in make investment decisions. 
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Table 1. Optimal investment intensity rules 
  Maximise producers' surplus  Maximise social surplus 
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Table 2. Directional relationship between optimal investment intensity rules and 
advertising, export market promotion and research elasticities. 
  β ∂ γ ∂ i ˆ   ϕ ∂ γ ∂ i ˆ   θ ∂ γ ∂ i ˆ   ξ ∂ γ ∂ i ˆ  
  Maximise Producers' Surplus 
() 0 ˆ = δ γ C A   +/- (+)  -  +  - 
() 0 ˆ = δ γ C M   - +/-  (+) +  - 
() 0 ˆ = δ γ C R   - - - + 
  Maximise Social Surplus 
() 1 ˆ = δ γ C A   + - + - 
() 1 ˆ = δ γ C M   - + + - 
() 1 ˆ = δ γ C R   - - - + 
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Table 3.  Elasticity and Parameter Values 
Elasticity/Data (in absolute value)  Symbol  Assumed Value/ Mean 
Own-price demand elasticity
a  η  0.23 
Domestic advertising demand elasticity
a  β  0.004 
Own-price export demand elasticity  e  5 
Export promotion demand elasticity  ϕ  0.004 
Own-price elasticity of supply
b  ε  0.431 
Research supply elasticity
c  θ  0.1 
Elasticity of cost with respect to research
d  ξ   0.092 
Trade's share of farm demand
e  k   0.31 
Variable cost as a share of market revenue
f  s  0.64 
Price ($ CWT)
 e  P  82.22 
a.  Source: Goddard and Griffith 
b.  Source: Cranfield and Goddard 
c. Source:  Widmer  et al. 
d. Source:  Chan-Kang  et al. 
e.  Based on average of annual values over 1995-1998 
f. Source:  OMAFRA 
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Table 4. Base case optimal investment intensities under alternative optimisation assumptions 










a Intensity Share Intensity Share Intensity Share
Domestic Generic 
Advertising 
0.231                0.325 0.171 0.353 0.078 0.325 0.008 0.036
Export Market 
Promotion 
0.072               
               
         
0.101 0.013 0.026 0.024 0.101 0.001 0.003
Production 
Research 
0.407 0.574 0.301 0.622 0.138 0.574 0.231 0.961
Total 0.71 0.485 0.24 0.24
   
               
 
a. Share shows the proportion of total investment accounted for by the respective investment alternative
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  Value of the shocked parameter 
  097 . 0 = ξ   105 . 0 = θ   3255 . 0 = k  
A γ   0.231 0.171 0.231 0.171 0.221 0.165 
  (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)  (-4.2)  (-3.5) 
M γ   0.072 0.013 0.072 0.013 0.072 0.013 
  (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.6) (5.2) 
R γ   0.805 0.595 0.029 0.021 0.578 0.431 
  (97.9)  (97.9) (-92.9) (-92.9)  (42.0)  (43.2) 
  087 . 0 = ξ   095 . 0 = θ   2945 . 0 = k  
A γ   0.231 0.171 0.231 0.171 0.241 0.177 
  (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (4.6) (3.7) 
M γ   0.072 0.013 0.072 0.013 0.071 0.012 
  (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)  (-0.6)  (-5.3) 
R γ   0.009 0.006 0.785 0.580 0.220 0.161 
  (-97.9)  (-97.9) (92.9) (92.9)  (-45.9)  (-46.4) 
a. Values in cells show shocked optimal investment intensities, values in parentheses 
show percent change from base case values.
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  Value of the shocked parameter 
  097 . 0 = ξ   105 . 0 = θ   3255 . 0 = k  
A γ   0.050 0.008 0.167 0.009 0.061 0.008 
 (-36.0)  (-5.8)  (114.1)  (1.4)  (-22.0)  (-3.0) 
M γ   0.016 0.001 0.052 0.001 0.020 0.001 
 (-36.0)  (-5.8)  (114.1)  (1.4)  (-18.1)  (5.7) 
R γ   0.174 0.231 0.021 0.231 0.159 0.231 
 (26.7)  (0.2)  (-84.8)  (-0.1)  (15.7)  (0.1) 
  087 . 0 = ξ   095 . 0 = θ   2945 . 0 = k  
A γ   0.178 0.009 0.051 0.009 0.109 0.009 
 (128.1)  (6.6)  (-34.8)  (-1.4)  (39.3)  (3.2) 
M γ   0.055 0.001 0.016 0.001 0.032 0.001 
 (128.1)  (6.6)  (-34.8)  (-1.4)  (32.4)  (-5.8) 
R γ   0.007 0.230 0.173 0.231 0.099 0.231 
 (-95.2)  (-0.3)  (25.8)  (0.1)  (-28.0)  (-0.1) 
a. Values in cells show shocked optimal investment intensities, values in parentheses 
show percent change from base case values.
























Figure 1. Schematic of the economic framework 
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Footnotes 
                                                           
1 A variety of related topics have been examined, including optimality of observed 
investment levels (Holloway et al.), advertising and promotion effectiveness (Brester and 
Schroeder; Comeau et al.; Cranfield and Goddard; Ding and Kinnucan; Kinnucan et al.; 
Richards et al.; Richards and Patterson; Piggott et al.; Ward and Lambert), the 
relationship between market power and benefits of production research (Alston et al., 
1999; Hamilton and Sunding), and the distribution of advertising and research benefits 
along the marketing channel (Wohlgenant 1993,1999; Chung and Kaiser). 
2 Assuming a fixed proportion processing technology allows for consideration of one 
market level rather than a vertically related market structure. 
3 Recognise that the shifts do not have to be parallel, all of the curves could undergo 
pivotal shifts, see, for example, Chung and Kaiser.  However, the welfare outcome may 
differ depending on the nature and magnitude of different types of shifts. 
4 Returns to primary production related research tend to be dynamic in nature.  By 
assuming a static model, it is assumed the change in producers' surplus due to research 
equals the discounted stream of research benefits. 
5 See Kinnucan (1999) for further discussion related to this export demand function. 
6 This is due to the complex nature of and differences in the denominators under different 
optimisation scenarios.   
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